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Introduction
Despite information and research being available in the area of tort liability, including relevant
topics in public school law, there are limited resources on the topic for school transportation
litigation. The question arises with the motor driven vehicle exception of sovereign immunity
and how this may pertain to litigation involving school bus services.
Section 101.051 of the Texas Tort Claims Act only waives governmental immunity against
school districts and junior college districts for negligence claims arising out of the operation of
motor vehicles (Civil Practice and Remedies Code §101.051, 1985). Walsh et al. (2014) further
identified school districts as being shielded by Texas law from tort liability unless motor vehicles
are involved. The elements of a Tort Claims Act claim under the motor vehicle exception are:
(a) property damage, personal injury or death; (b) proximately caused by; (c) the wrongful acts
or omissions or the negligence of an employee by the governmental entity; and (d) acting within
the scope of his or her employment; if (a) the property damage, personal injury or death arises
from the operation or use of a motor driven vehicle or motor driven equipment; and (b) the
employee would be personally liable to the claimant under Texas law (Texas Civil Practice and
Remedies Code).
Public education officials may have limited education, training, and knowledge in the area of
pupil transportation, especially in the legality and interpretation of the Texas Tort Claims Act,
the Texas Civil Remedies and Practice Code, and sovereign immunity. Clarity of the
aforementioned is necessary for school district administrators and pupil transportation officials to
be able to answer the simple question, "When am I, or the school, liable?" Further, an
underlying concern in the public school environment is the perpetual apprehension and anxiety
that the actions of a public school employee may result in a lawsuit. It has been commonly
accepted that school liability cases have increased over the past years, specifically in the areas of
i
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tort liability (Dragan, 2010). Additionally, school employees may be confused and unaware how
tort liability, negligence, and sovereign immunity interact. These areas are seldom addressed to
the extent necessary for an administrator to be fluent in knowledge and preparedness when faced
with tort liability claims. Thus, administrators are at risk for not being prepared to handle
litigation appropriately.

Methods
The primary purpose of this qualitative case study was to investigate the Texas Tort Claims Act
as presented in the Texas Civil Practice and Remedies Code and sovereign immunity and how it
relates to Texas public school district transportation services. The focus of this research was to
determine possible liability for public schools for incidents that occur beyond vehicular accidents
(crashes). This includes incidents at a school bus stop, walking to or from the school bus stop,
and student incidents on the bus not directly resulting from a vehicular collision, which may
result in physical or mental injury to the claimant while on the school bus.
This research consisted of a legal analysis of multiple civil litigation cases in an overall case
study reviewing sovereign immunity and the Texas Tort Claims Act and how it related to pupil
transportation services in Texas. According to Zucker (2009), the researcher's actions in a case
study include "recording, constructing and presenting, and producing a chronicle, a profile of
facts" (p. 4). Creswell (2013) identified several defining characteristics in qualitative case
studies. These include:
• Case study research begins with the identification of a specific case
• The intent of conducting the case study is important
• A hallmark of a good case study is the presentation of an in-depth understanding of the
case
• The selection of how to approach the analysis of the data in a case study will vary
• Essential to understanding analysis is that good case study research involves a description
of the case
• The themes or issues may be organized into a chronology by the researcher, analyzed
across cases for similarities and differences among the cases, or presented as a theoretical
model
• Case studies often conclude with general lessons learned from studying the case (p. 9899).
Additionally, the researcher is interpreting, synthesizing and clarifying, and producing a history,
meanings, and understandings. Overall, case studies may be "exploratory, descriptive,
interpretive and explanatory" (Zucker, p. 4, 2009). In summary, the legal analysis in this case
study of the selected court cases served to provide clarity and a definitive answer to the central
research question and the sub-research questions.
The method of procedure for this research was based on the following central research question:
when is a school district and/or school employee liable for tort litigation in pupil transportationrelated incidents?
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Key Court Cases
The all-encompassing question of this research is simple: When is a school district liable for
incidents involving student transportation? The classic lawyer answer is still "it depends."
Although there have been numerous cases represented in this study and a substantial amount of
legal data and analysis, one must still answer this question. The process to determine the answer
to this central research question and the sub-research questions should be short, simple, and
encompassing. However, one must be mindful that new cases or revised legislation may provide
new interpretations to the law and, therefore, invalidate the information presently provided in
this study.
This first question of this study sets forth to clarify how the Texas Tort Claims Act under the
Texas Civil Practice and Remedies Code directly affects pupil transportation services for Texas
public school districts. Undoubtedly, the 13 cases presented and analyzed in this research have
proven that the Texas Tort Claims Act and sovereign immunity directly affect Texas public
school districts, pupil transportation departments, and professional employees. The foundation
case of this study, Barr v. Bernhard ( 1978) clarified in the Texas Supreme Court ruling, stating
that "the law is well settled in this state that an independent school district is an agency of the
state and, while exercising governmental functions, is not answerable for its negligence in a suit
sounding in tort" (Walsh et al., 2014, p. 379). The subsequent 13 cases analyzed in this research
involving pupil transportation serviced in Texas referenced Barr as the first case involving tort
liability with a school district. For the purposes of this article, the cases that will be closely
analyzed are Barr v. Bernhard ( 1978), Hitchcock v. Garvin ( 1987), and Contreras v. Lufkin
Independent School District (1991), the latter two where sovereign immunity was waived by the
school district.

Barr v. Bernhard, 562 S.W.2d 844 (1978)
It is important to first note the 1978 Texas Supreme Court Case Barr v. Bernhard. The
interpretation of the Texas Torts Claims Act and sovereign immunity was made clear in this
Texas Supreme Court case. Although Barr did not involve a school bus or any transportationrelated incidents, it is important to include this case as it serves as the basis for the rulings of the
subsequent court cases. In Barr, it was referenced that the Texas Tort Claims Act was enacted in
1970 and that Section 3 of the Act provided a waiver of governmental immunity for injuries
arising out of the conditions or use of property, premises defects, and the use of publicly-owned
motor vehicles (Barr v. Bernhard, 1978). However, the Texas Legislature provided a more
limited waiver of governmental immunity. In accordance with Section 19A of the Texas Tort
Claims Act, a school district's liability is "limited to causes of action arising from the use of
motor vehicles" (Barr v. Bernhard, 1978, p. 3). Importantly, it was also affirmed in Barr that an
independent school district is an agency of the state and not answerable for its negligence when
exercising governmental functions.
In this case, a student was working with his calf at the school's agricultural barn. The student
was present after regular school hours, thus being unsupervised and with no school personnel on
site. As the student was working with the calf, the calf struck a metal support pole for the roof.
As the pole gave way, the roof collapsed, trapping the student underneath the structure, causing
severe injuries (Barr v. Bernhard, 1978). Bernard brought suit against the Kerrville Independent

36
Published by SFA ScholarWorks, 2016

3

School Leadership Review, Vol. 11 [2016], Iss. 2, Art. 5

School District and a number of individual employees alleging that they were negligent in
several aspects: (a) by failing to properly inspect the facility; (b) by failing to maintain or
supervise the facility; and (c) by allowing the facility to be used while in a condition of disrepair
(Barr v. Bernhard, 1978). The San Antonio Court of Appeals affirmed the holding of the trial
court regarding Kerrville Independent School District but reversed the judgment granting the
individual defendants' motion for summary judgment, for which the individual defendants
appealed.
The question arose as to whether the Kerrville Independent School District was liable for the
damages due to the alleged negligent supervision of the student and the failure to properly
maintain and supervise the facility. Bernhard sought to avoid the preclusive effect of Section
19A of the Texas Tort Claims Act on his cause of action against Kerrville ISO by arguing that
the court should abolish the provisions established in Section 19A and that the school district
waived immunity when they acquired liability insurance. The Texas Supreme Court held that the
school district was immune under the doctrine of governmental immunity. Further, the Court
determined that any matter to be addressed regarding the abolishment of Section 19A is to be left
to the Texas Legislature.
The Court held that the statute referencing the personal liability of a professional school
employee means that "a professional school employee is not personally liable for acts done
within scope of employment, and which involve exercise of judgment and discretion, except in
circumstances where, in disciplining a student, the employee uses excessive force or his
negligence results in bodily injury to the student" (Barr v. Bernhard, 1978, p, I). Thus, the
Texas Supreme Court held in this case that the trial court was correct in their ruling granting the
motion for summary judgment for the individual defendants.
Hitcl,cock v. Garvin, 738 S.W.2d (1987)
In Hitchcock v. Garvin (1987), the Texas Court of Appeals in Dallas heard a case involving a
student injury while crossing a street after disembarking a school bus. The minor appellant,
Emily Christine Hitchcock, sustained injuries after she was released from the school bus
operated by Lloyd Dean Morris and owned by the Plano Independent School District.
Immediately after Hitchcock was discharged from the bus, and as she was crossing the street, a
motor vehicle driven by Rex Martin Garvin struck Hitchcock. The Hitchcocks sued both the
school district and the driver who struck their child. The Hitchcocks allege that "a fact issue
exists as to whether the bus driver Morris properly activated the flashers on the bus to indicate
that the school bus was slowing, then stopping and discharging school children, thus constituting
an act falling within the motor vehicle exception to governmental immunity" (Hitchcock v.
Garvin, 1987, p. 2). This was filed in lieu of negligent supervision, which would fall under the
immunity clause in the Tort Claims Act. The court of appeals agreed with the claim made by
Hitchcock.
The issue that arose in Hitchcock was if the school district waived sovereign immunity by not
activating the red warning lights on the school bus when students were exiting, did this fall
within the definition of operation and use as outlined in the Texas Tort Claims Act? The court
determined that the failure to activate the red warning lights on the school bus when students are
exiting constitutes an act or omission arising from the operation or use of a motor driven vehicle
37
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within the definition of the motor vehicle exception in the Texas Tort Claims Act. The court
agreed that the failure to activate the red warning flashers of a school bus constituted an act of
omission arising from the operation or use of a motor vehicle within the meaning of the Tort
Claims Act exception
The appeal from Thomas R. Hitchcock and Emily Christine Hitchcock brought forth two points
of error from the trial court:
( 1) The trial court erred in granting summary judgment in favor of Plano ISO and Morris and
in failing to grant the Hitchcocks' motion for new trial because there existed genuine
material fact issues; and
(2) The trial court erred in granting summary judgment in favor of Plano ISO and Morris and
in failing to grant the Hitchcocks' motion for new trial because the Hitchcocks' claims
are not barred by the doctrine of governmental immunity as a matter of law since the
claims arose out of the use and operation of a motor vehicle. (Hitchcock v. Garvin, 1987,
pp. 1-2).
The Court of Appeals explained in their summary that the Hitchcocks included and attached to
their response to Plano ISD's motion for summary judgment excerpts from the instruction
manual for school bus drivers used by Plano ISO. The excerpts from the Program Handbook
and Instruction Guide: Texas School Bus Driving Training Course included the "instruction that
unloading students living either on the right side or left side of the roadway, the driver must
'activate alternating flasher warning lights at least 500 feet from bus stop"' (Hitchcock v. Garvin,
1987, pp. 2-3). Additionally, the Hitchcocks filed their second amended original petition at the
same time the response to the motion for summary judgment was filed, asserting that Plano ISO
was negligent in its operation and use of a motor vehicle by "failing to operate school bus in
compliance with traffic regulations of the State of Texas pertaining to the use of flashers when
discharging children," and "failing to operate and use warning signals in a timely fashion to
indicate to oncoming traffic that school bus was coming to a stop or had stopped" (Hitchcock v.
Garvin, 1987, p. 3). Finally, Garvin included in the supplemental transcript his responses to the
Hitchcocks' interrogatories and requests for admissions, which included his statement that "there
were no flashing lights of any kind illuminated on the bus when the accident occurred"
(Hitchcock v. Garvin, 1987, p. 3). The Court of Appeals noted in the ruling:
The Hitchcocks filed a response to appellees' motion for summary judgment expressly
presenting to the trial court their contention that Emily Hitchcock's injury was
proximately caused by the bus driver's failure to use the flasher lights while operating the
school bus, and that such action constituted negligence arising from the operation and use
of a motor-driven vehicle. (Hitchcock v. Garvin, 1987, p. 3)
Thus, the Court of Appeals ruled that the alleged acts of Plano ISO and the bus driver arose from
the operation of a motor vehicle and, within the meaning of Section 101.021 of the Texas Tort
Claims Act, constituted a waiver of the doctrine of governmental immunity.

Contreras v. Lujkin Independent Sc/100/ District, 810 S.W.2d 23 (1991)
In the Court of Appeals case of Contreras v. Lufkin Independent School District, an issue arose
of a student being released at the wrong bus stop. The Court of Appeals held that "pleadings
raised justiciable fact issue as to whether school district enjoyed sovereign immunity from
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liability, precluding summary judgment" (Contreras v. Lufkin /SD, 1991, p. 1). The issue was
presented when the student, Esmeralda Contreras, was released at the wrong bus stop in an
unfamiliar location and was then struck by an automobile. The facts of the case are presented
from an excerpt from the plaintiffs' First Amended Original Petition:
On or about November 22, 1988, plaintiff Esmeralda Contreras, a six-year old girl,
completed her day's school and boarded a school bus operated by defendant Lufkin
Independent School District to be taken home.
At the time the normal practice of the Lufkin Independent School District bus that drove
Esmeralda Contreras home was to drop her off right across Abney Street from her house,
then to wait with lights flashing while she crossed the street to her house. However, the
Lufkin Independent School District school bus that was supposed to drive Esmeralda
home on November 22, 1988, dropped her off on Cain Street, around the corner from her
house, rather than on Abney Street. When plaintiff Esmeralda Contreras did try to make
her way home from the unfamiliar location where the school bus had dropped her off, she
was violently and unexpectedly struck crossing Abney Street by a 1978 Chevrolet
Caravan automobile being driven by defendant James Kegler. Hearing the screech of
defendant Kegler's tires moments before his automobile struck Esmeralda, plaintiff
Martina Contreras ran out of the front door of her house and saw her daughter face down
and motionless on the side of the road with blood flowing from her head. (Contreras v.
Lufkin /SD, 1991, pp. 1-2)
Did the release of the student at the wrong bus stop result in the negligent use or operation of the
motor-driven vehicle by Lufkin Independent School District as defined in the Texas Tort Claims
Act? Chief Justice Walker of the Texas Supreme Court stated in his opinion that the damages
and injuries were proximately caused by the negligent conduct of the defendant, Lufkin
Independent School District. Walker noted that the school district breached its duty by letting
"Esmeralda Contreras off the school bus in a location from which Esmeralda Contreras knew
how to get to her house without having to expose herself to danger while crossing the street"
(Contreras v. Lufkin /SD, 1991, p. 2).
The court in Contreras referenced the decision the Texas Supreme Court made in case of Mount
Pleasant Independent School District v. Estate of Lindburg ( 1989). The court highlighted the
differences of the cases, specifically to the child in Lindburg being struck and killed by an
automobile after the school bus drove off and was already 200 yards from where the child exited
the bus and was struck by the passing pickup truck. The Court of Appeals in Contreras quoted
the Supreme Court to provide justification for their ruling:
In order for a claim to fall within the limited waiver of sovereign immunity, the finder of
fact must determine that damages suffered were "proximately caused by the wrongful act
or omission or negligence ofan employee acting within his scope ofemployment ... [and
arose] from the operation or use of a motor-driven vehicle ... " (Heyer v. North East
Independent School District, 1987; as cited in Contreras v. Lufkin Independent School
District, 1991, p. 3).
Further, the court agreed with the appellee that the case of Mount Pleasant Independent School
District v. Estate of Lindburg ( 1989) has "significant bearing upon our case even though the
threshold question in Lindburg dealt with the standard of care to be imposed upon a school
39
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district to insure a student's safety after disembarking a district provided bus, and the limits of
the legislature's waiver of sovereign immunity" (Contreras v. Lufkin /SD, 1991, p. 3). Although
the 217th District Court of Angelina County granted summary judgment to the school district,
the Court of Appeals reversed and remanded, holding that "it is clear ... that appellant's pleadings
were factually adequate to avoid the defense of sovereign immunity and to open the door for the
fact finder to determine liability and damage" (Contreras v. Lufkin /SD, 1991, p. 3). Further, the
Court of Appeals held that "the trial court erred in granting summary judgment in that
appellants' pleadings on their face brought their claims within the provisions of [the Texas Tort
Claims Act] Section 101.02l(l)(A), and such claims were not barred by appellee's plea of
governmental immunity" (Contreras v. Lufkin /SD, 1991, p. 3). Finally, the Court of Appeals
determined that the trial court erred in holding that the complainants' pleading demonstrated that
the accident in this case did not arise from the use or operation of a motor-driven vehicle and that
the pleadings are to the contrary. (Contreras v. Lufkin /SD, 1991 ).
Review of relevant case law
As previously mentioned, 13 cases encompassed the sample size in the presentation and analysis
of data (Barr v. Bernhard served as the foundation case for this study and was not included in the
presentation and analysis of the data since it did not involve a school bus). In an effort to
simplify this question, Table 1 provides the overview of the 13 cases extensively investigated in
this study, a brief summary of each case, and a determination on whether the school district
waived sovereign immunity and was, therefore, found liable for damages.

The table provides the case citation, a brief statement of the facts, and whether the school district
waived immunity in the case. The table shows that of the 13 cases reviewed, 9 found that the
district did not waive immunity. For this sample of data, 69 percent of the cases were judged in
favor of the school district.
Findings

After the presentation and analysis of data, this research has shown two distinct facts that must
be acknowledged by all student transportation employees:
1. School bus drivers are considered professional employees under Section 21.174(b)(3) of
the Texas Education Code, which requires school districts to "employ school bus drivers
certified in accordance with standards and qualifications promulgated jointly by the State
Board of Education and the Texas Department of Public Safety as required by law ... "
(Texas Education Code, Section 2 l .174(b)(3); as cited in LeLeaux v. Hamshire-Fannett
/SD, 1992,p.4);and
2. Negligent use or operation of the motor vehicle may result in a waiver of immunity for a
school district and/or a professional employee.
Multiple cases were identified that relate the Texas Tort Claims Act to pupil transportation in
Texas. Although Barr v. Bernhard (1978) did not involve student transportation, it was the first
notable case to reference the Texas Tort Claims Act and Texas Education Code Section 21.912.
It is important to appropriately interpret and understand the decision the court made in Barr and
why the Court of Appeals reached their conclusion.
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Table 1

Summary ofCourt Cases
Court Case
Estate ofGarza v. McAllen
/SD (1981)

Facts

Immunity
Waived?

Student Wally Gana killed when Mark Trevino used knife to
stab Gana while on school bus

No

District/employees failed to provide adequate medical care to
student with cerebral palsy who suffered convulsions on board
school bus

No

Student injured when she disembarked from school bus and then
hit by a car crossing the street due to failure of bus driver to
activate red warning lights

Yes

Mount Pleasant /SD v.
Lindburg (l 989)

Child struck after disembarking school bus - bus was I 00-200
yards away from scene of accident

No

Contreras v. Lufkin /SD
(1991)

Student was released at wrong stop and killed when attempting
to cross the street

Yes

Luna v. Harlingen (1991)

Two children sustained injuries when they were struck by a
third-party vehicle while waiting at the bus stop for school bus

No

Student injured after attempting to board bus through rear
emergency exit door.

No

One student injured and another killed in motor vehicle accident
driven by the students' friend after bus released students at nondesignated stop

No

Austin /SD v. Gutierrez
(2001)

Student killed by motorist after disembarking bus and being
signaled with bus horn by driver that it was safe to cross street

Yes

Montoya v. Houston /SD
(2005)

Student with cognitive disabilities released himself from
protective harness and exited bus through rear emergency door
while bus was in motion

No

Elgin /SD v. R.N. (2006)

Student was left on bus after bus returned to transportation
facility and door was locked by bus driver and attendant

Yes

Breckenridge /SD v.
Valdez (2006)

Student was left on bus after bus returned to transportation
facility by bus driver and attendant

No

Houston /SD v. PERX
(2014)

Claim of sexual assault on bus due to the failure to properly
operate the security camera on the school bus

No

Hopkins v. Spring /SD
(1987)
Hitchcock v. Garvin
(1987)

LeLeaux v. HamshireFannelt /SD (1992)
Goston v. Hutchison
(1993)
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As with Hopkins v. Spring !SD (1987), several Texas courts have held that when injuries are not
the proximate result of the use or operation of the school bus, but the bus provides the setting for
the ~njury, the actions do not fall within section IO 1.051 exception to immunity (Hopkins v.
Sprmg !SD, 1987). Moreover, Hopkins provided clarity that the precedent was construed in Barr
v. Bernhard that school districts are governmental entities. Since the Barr decision, and
reaffirmed in Hopkins, the courts have consistently ruled that virtually every action a school
district performs is classified as a governmental function (Walsh et al., 2014). This consistency
ascertains that sovereign immunity is serving its primary function, as designed, by financially
protecting Texas public schools from litigation and damages, which is also fortunate for Texas
taxpayers.
Central Research Question
In an effort to answer the central research question, we revisit Estate of Garza v. McAllen
Independent School District ( 1981) where the court questioned the determination of immunity or
the waiver of immunity on behalf of the school district in one precise statement:
Do the facts set out in our record give rise to a claim for damages' proximately caused by
the negligence or wrongful act or omission of any officer or employee ... arising from the
operation and use ofa motor-driven vehicle? (Estate ofGarza v. McAllen, 1981, p. 2)

This research has shown that for a court to find a waiver of sovereign immunity and liability for
injuries sustained due to a school bus-related incident, Texas courts have consistently required
the following:
• a nexus between the use and operation of the motor-driven vehicle or equipment and the
plaintiff's injuries constituting more than just the simple involvement of the property; and
• the use of the vehicle must have actually caused the injury complained of by the claimant.
Further, the courts have determined in multiple cases that the operation or use of a motor vehicle
does not cause injury and thus constitute a waiver of immunity if it does no more than furnish the
condition that makes the injury possible. Cases that have ruled in this manner include: Estate of
Garza v. McAllen Independent School District ( 1981 ); Hopkins v. Spring Independent School
District (1987); Leleaux v. Hamshire-Fannell Independent School District (1992); Montoya v.
Houston Independent School District (2005); and Breckenridge Independent School District v.
Valdez (2006). When the school bus is only the setting for the injury and the injury is not a
result of the direct operation or use of the motor vehicle, governmental immunity for the school
district is not waived.
Two-Step Process to Determine Waiver of Immunity
A two-step process was discussed in Austin Independent School District v. Gutierrez (2001) to
determine if there was a waiver of immunity on the part of the school district. First, the court is
to decide if there was a use or operation of a motor vehicle. The court identified and defined
operation and use by citing Satterfield v. Sallerjie/d ( 1969). The court expanded their
discussion, by referencing "in general when applying the term 'use' or 'operation' in school bus
cases, appellate courts have examined whether the employee's acts involved actual use or
operation of the vehicle, rather than the supervision of children" (Austin !SD v. Gutierrez, 2001,
p. 3). In Breckenridge v. Valdez !SD (2006), it was noted that "when the injuries arise from an
employee's acts or omissions involving only supervision or control of children, immunity has not
42
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been waived even if the acts took place on or near the bus" (Breckenridge /SD v. Valdez, 2006, p.
6). However, if the plaintiff's injuries "arise from an employee's 'affirmative action' actually
using or operating the bus, the school district's immunity has been waived" (Breckenridge /SD v.
Valdez, 2006, p. 6). Goston and Estate ofGarza affirmed that if the employee's act involved
only supervision or control, immunity has not been waived, even if the act took place on or near
the motor vehicle.
The second step "requires an understanding of the nexus between the injury and the use of
operation of the vehicle that is required" (Austin /SD v. Gutierrez, 200 I, p. 3). It was determined
in LeLeaux that the statutory phrase arises from requires that there be some connection between
the injury and the act of using or operating the vehicle. For example, in Austin /SD v. Gutierrez
(2001 ), Austin ISO asserted that the procedures followed by the bus driver when unloading
passengers, which included honking the horn, did not constitute a use or operation of the vehicle.
Instead, Austin ISO claimed that these procedures were "supervisory in nature and are analogous
to the actions taken by an individual supervising children at a crosswalk' (Austin /SD v.
Gutierrez, 200 I).
In response, Gutierrez contended that the only use of a school bus is to "transport students and
the process of transporting them does not end until the children have safely crossed the street"
(Austin !SD v. Gutierrez, 2001, p. 3). Gutierrez specifically referenced the use of the horn by the
driver and that this operation or use of the motor vehicle contributed to the accident. Gutierrez
also cited the training manual for bus drivers, which specifically referenced the correct
procedure, which does not include the honking of the bus's horn. The court determined that this
was the nexus between the operation or use of the motor vehicle and the injury of the claimant.
Was the Bus at the Scene of the Incident?
One question that arose was whether the bus was at the location of the incident when the incident
occurred. The court in A ustin /SD v. Gutierrez (2001) stated: "it is much easier to find there was
not use or operation when there was not a bus present at the scene to use or operate" (p. 5).
Table 2 summarizes the cases presented in this research and outlines which buses were located at
the scene of the incident, if it was determined negligent operation or negligent supervision, and if
the district waived immunity.

It is noted that an anomaly occurs in Contreras v. Lufkin /SD (1991 ), where the school district
waived immunity and negligent operation was found, even with the bus not present at the scene.
The school district was found to have breached its duty by letting the student off the bus at the
wrong school bus stop, thus exposing herself to danger and the resulting in damages that were
"proximately caused by the wrongful act or omission or negligence of an employee acting within
the scope of employment" (Heyer v. North East Independent School District, 1987; as cited in
Contreras v. Lufkin Independent School District, 1991, p. 3).
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Table 2
Was the School Bus at the Scene of the Incident?

Court Case
Barr v. Bernhard (1978)
Estate of Garza v. McAllen JSD (1981)
Hopkins v. Spring JSD (1987)
Hitchcock v. Garvin (1987)
Mount Pleasant !SD v. Lindburg (1989)
Contreras v. Lufkin ISD (1991)
Luna v. Harlingen (1991)
Leleaux v. Hamshire-Fannett JSD (1992)
Goston v. Hutchison (1993)
Austin JSD v. Gutierrez (2001)
Montoya v. Houston JSD (2005)
Elgin ISD v. R.N. (2006)
Breckenridge ISD v. Valdez (2006)
Houston JSD v. PERX (2014)

Was the bus
p_resent?
NIA

Yes
Yes
Yes

No
No
No
Yes

No
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Whose Operation is Necessary to Give Rise to Liability?
To expand upon the question of operation and use of the motor vehicle in order to determine
liability, one must determine whose operation is necessary to give rise to a waiver of immunity?
This was affirmed in Leleaux v. Hamshire-Fannett Independent School District (1992), in which
the student was injured after falling from the back emergency door. Since the operator of the bus
was not present, and the bus served as the setting of the injury, the district did not waive
immunity. Through this interpretation, the Court held it is the school district's employee's use or
operation of the motor vehicle that would waive immunity. In this ruling, it was determined that
the negligence of the injured party or a third party does not constitute a waiver of immunity.
Conclusion

Unquestionably, case law, legal terminology, and interpretation of the law can be difficult. The
importance of preparing educators, administrators, and staff of a school district in curriculum and
instruction areas may overshadow such legal matters. Additionally, with the increasing focus on
training of the curriculum and instruction divisions of the school district, the transportation
department may be overlooked. Further, a school's transportation department may be the only
method for many students to attend school daily. Safety is paramount in pupil transportation. A
school bus driver is responsible for up to seventy pupils and their behavior while also having to
be extremely attentive to the road and other drivers.
There is a wealth of information regarding pupil transportation available to department and
district administrators. The National School Specifications and Procedures manual is developed
by a national congregation of pupil transportation officials. The information provided in the
manual is "available for states to consider when establishing their standards, specifications,
recommendations and guidelines" (National School Transportation Specifications and
Procedures, 20 l 0, p. 6). This information includes operational procedures, mechanical repairs,
employment practices, and driver training. However, much of this information regards "best
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practices" and does not provide clear and concise legal information or expertise. Further, a new
book was published in 2013 entitled Best Practices in Student Transportation. This book
emphasizes the "lack of consistent management training that covers the issues specific to pupil
transportation" (Roberts, 2013, p. ii). However, there is still a limited amount of information
regarding liability in pupil transportation. Organizations such as the Texas Association of Pupil
Transportation, the National Association of Pupil Transportation, and the Texas Association of
School Business Officials provide occasional professional development courses regarding legal
issues and liability concerns in pupil transportation. These courses are beneficial; however, the
information provided must cover a wide array of subjects in a short period of time. Until now,
the issue of tort liability and litigation in pupil transportation in Texas has not been documented
or presented in a collective manner beneficial to school administrators and transportation
managers. This research has hopefully served to fill a missing piece in the literature regarding
specific case law studies in Texas for Texas pupil transportation officials and district
administrators.
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